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INTRODUCTION
 Humanity is faced today with the grim prospects and disturbing current realities of 
loss of resources, deterioration of habitats, and economic failures. Our predicament 
can be clearly seen in the light of our cultural evolution from a small population of 
itinerant bands of foragers in the Pleistocene past to an agro-industrial global civiliza-
tion. Although the transitions were neither uniform nor identical in various parts of 
the world, the impact of the advent of agriculture and industry were global. They were 
also profound. 
 In our search for an understanding of our present predicament and for feasible solu-
tions to the ecological crisis, it is prudent to reflect upon the ecological implications of 
our evolutionary journey. In this regard it is useful to consider the course of human 
cultural evolution from a cross-cultural perspective, as well as to focus on specific case 
studies. I will attempt here to draw upon my knowledge of Egypt as a manifestation of 
global cultural developments (Hassan 1974, 1987, 1988, in press A, and in press B). 
Egypt may have its peculiarities, but it also shares with many other countries the key 
evolutionary transitions from hunting-gathering to agriculture, the rise of a nation-
state and civilization, a history of encounters between civilizations, a colonial ex-
perience, and the trials of a developing nation in a global industrial techno-complex.
PARADIGMATIC STATEMENTS
 In the following pages, I develop the thesis that among hunter-gatherers, the con-
cept of self and the sense of self-esteem were linked primarily with social affiliation ex-
pressed in terms of a sharing ethos. Later, the advent of agriculture led to the 
emergence of a hierarchical society which added "status" as another dimension of gain-
ing self-esteem. However, in archaic agrarian societies, access to status goods was 
monopolized by and restricted to nobility (landowners, priests, and governors) and
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royalty. In such societies opportunities for social mobility were limited. Recently the 
advent of large-scale commerce and industry destroyed the ancient regime and created 
opportunities for social mobility, which has promoted consumerism. The rise of mass 
consumerism of status goods over the last two hundred years has been responsible for 
an unprecedented onslaught on the resources of the earth. Consumerism, within an in-
dustrial/technological way of living, is intimately cross-linked to an ethos of competi-
tion and a movement "against" others. This ethos is intertwined with a psychology of 
aggression and conflict, which fosters an ideology of dominance and competition 
towards the earth, other members of society from different classes or social categories, 
and nations. 
 Discourse on environment and civilization is often phrased in terms of (1) environ-
ment as a stage for cultural performance, (2) the impact of climatic or other en-
vironmental change on cultural change, triggering agricultural innovations, and the 
destruction of civilization, or (3) the impact of culture on the environment, e.g., the 
role of technology in modern industrial nations in destroying human habitats. 
 I adopt here the view that the relationship between environment and culture ought 
to be regarded in terms of a cybernetic model with multiple networks characterized by 
various feed-back linkages. Culture and environment are mediated by the actions of in-
dividuals in human societies who are conditioned by their own cultural upbringing, 
and who are participants in the making of present and future cultural achievements. 
Humans act within groups, expressing and influencing collective behavior and 
ideology. They act within a specific territorial setting and at a given time in a historical 
trajectory. 
 The actions of individuals are inseparable from their world view, ethos, values, con-
cerns, interests, fears, modes of perceiving environmental possibilities and potentials, 
knowledge-base, patterns of decision-making, and problem-solving. Individuals are 
situated in societies that are embedded in a cultural past and inter-linked with other 
human groups by bonds of variable strengths. Communication from one generation 
to another, between members of the same society and between peoples of different 
cultures transmits knowledge and serves as an intermediary between thoughts and ac-
tions. 
 Working on a human scale in a cultural matrix, human groups are ultimately 
situated in a natural setting characterized by a specific geographic distribution of 
resources within a given landscape. In many respects, nature behaves independently of 
human actions (e.g., natural climatic fluctuations, volcanic eruptions, etc.), and 
behaves according to processes of succession, causal networking, and concatenation. 
The long-term characteristics of an environment (climatic stability, fluctuations, and 
secular changes) are crucial for interpreting cultural change. However, the role of the 
environment should not be restricted to its potential impact on promoting change, but 
also on its innate resistance to certain actions (e.g., lack of certain resources, obstacles 
to transport, etc.). The vulnerability of natural environments to human actions, 
especially following industrial practices, has also linked humans with nature in an in-
timate causal interrelationship. 
 From this perspective, I wish to emphasize the concept of "habitat" as a central con-
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cept in human ecology. A habitat is defined as an interactive setting of human ac-
tivities within a specific spatiotemporal frame. The habitat varies in spatial range and 
temporal depth depending on culture. Bands occupy small regions by comparison to 
empires. Access to past environmental information varies also from one culture to 
another depending on the relative role of oral tradition and written historical 
documents. Ideology (religious, philosophical, or aesthetic views) and technology also 
define the kind and pattern for exploiting or conserving resources. 
 An analysis of the relationship between the environment and civilization is inade-
quate if it does not take into consideration not only the forces that influence the 
spatial and temporal range of human activities, the size and composition of the social 
unit, but also the objectives of the encounters between people and nature. 
 Our relationship with nature is largely dependent upon our desires. Desires are 
ultimately grounded in biological and psychological human needs, but are largely 
shaped by culture. Basic human needs for food, water, sleep, air, affiliation, and 
identity are compounded by our needs for security and safety from predators and 
adverse natural forces. These simple needs were reasonably satisfied as long as our 
numbers remained limited. 
 In general, interactions with nature are linked with such activities that concern secur-
ing food and shelter, protection, seeking friends and mates, recreation and enjoy-
ment, and extracting resources for display and consumption of status goods. These in-
teractions provide the immediate interface between people and nature. The collective 
impact on the earth is the result of localized activities by people situated within certain 
cultural traditions who not only set the range of limits and opportunities for certain 
economic activities, but more importantly provide a set of values and sensibilities that 
structure and delineate how we define and construe nature.
TOWARD A SOCIOECOLOGY OF CULTURAL 
        TRANSFORMATIONS
 Anthropologists recognize various stages of cultural transformation. Major transi-
tions include the advent of agriculture and the adoption of industry. I recognize here 
the following cultural modes: 
 I) Foraging 
 II) Specialized hunting, fishing, and gathering 
 III) Subsistence farming and nomadic herding 
 IV) Low-tech agriculture 
 V) Proto-Industrial agriculture 
 VI) Agro-industry 
 VII) Agribusiness 
 These modes are arranged in a hypothetical evolutionary order from foraging to 
agribusiness. In general, the evolutionary sequence is a model of developments that oc-
curred in different parts of the world at different times. The evolutionary sequence is a
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result of convergence as well as cross-cultural interactions. "Older" modes still survive 
in many parts of the world. 
 The cultural modes identified here are defined on the basis of subsistence, 
technology, and economic pursuits. However, they may also be characterized in terms 
of population growth rates, size of individual population units, spatial mobility, settle-
ment pattern, and other cultural attributes. 
 Although it is clear that industry and overpopulation are major causes for our cur-
rent ecological crisis, it is important to explain the sociocultural matrix that 
perpetuates industry and encourages rapid population growth. I suggest that popula-
tion increase after agriculture (Table 1) was linked with the social and economic advan-
tages of a large family and the relatively low cost of rearing children. I also propose 
that the rise of a managerial, military, and religious elite with the advent of state 
societies provided a stimulus both for population increase and consumerism. In ar-
chaic states before medieval times, consumerism was limited to a small segment of 
society. The breakdown of archaic societies and the advent of global commerce must 
be regarded as the key factor responsible for the rise of modern capitalism, financial in-
stitutions, militarism, and mass consumerism. It is the combination of rapid popula-
tion increase and the growing demands for consumer goods by the majority of the 
world's population that continue to drain and spoil the earth's resources. 
 The rise of social hierarchy in agrarian societies had led to an emphasis on acquisi-
tion of material status goods as the primary focus for gaining self-esteem. Whenever 
possible, achievements and "success", measured by the ability to acquire, consume, 
and display material status goods, became the focus of human behavior. This re-
fashioning of self and self-image, in terms of status, is in marked contrast to the 
growth of a sense of self in terms of one's fulfillment of social duties in a context of 
belonging, affiliation, sharing, and solidarity. 
 The emergence of a hierarchy of status was closely linked with the emergence of 
managers and chiefs following the adoption of agriculture. The ruling elite displayed 
their power and status by rare and expensive natural and manufactured objects. These 
items were usually of low or secondary value as food or practical items. This marked
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the emergence of an "inverted economy" based on the production and consumption of 
costly goods of little or no subsistence value (Hassan 1983).
LOW-TECH AGRICULTURE AND EARLY AGRARIAN STATES
 Agriculture must be regarded as the beginning of a new domain of human existence, 
predicated upon the ability to increase yields from natural resources through human 
intervention to unprecedented levels. By contrast, hunters and foragers are limited by 
the natural yield of wild game, aquatic resources and plants. Improvements in food 
procurement methods or food processing, e.g., trapping, use of bow and arrow, nets, 
fishing spears and so on increased the amount of wild harvests, but the ceiling of carry-
ing capacity could not be lifted much higher. It is estimated that hunting and foraging 
by the end of the Pleistocene could not have supported more than 10-12 million peo-
ple (Hassan 1982: 203-204). Hunting and gathering were also linked with a peripatetic 
model of existence that minimized the impact of people on their habitat. 
 The advent of agriculture beginning c. 10,000-8,000 years ago in the Near East and 
later in many parts of the world was followed in Mesopotamia and Egypt by the rise 
of state societies dominated by a governing elite. Agrarian state societies also emerged 
in other parts of the world following the introduction of agriculture. The exact 
character of political organization varied, but the state was, in general, under the rule 
of a king. In Egypt the king was divine. In other cases, kingship was sanctioned by 
divine or cosmic powers. 
 With the rise of early agricultural state societies we witness the beginning of an 
economy marked by a differentiation in the standard of living between a majority of 
farmers living at subsistence level and a small elite with a higher standard of living. Ac-
cess to goods was controlled by the ruling elite. The total world population and 
number of human groups were small. Under such conditions the impact of early 
agrarian societies on the environment was not substantial. Social organizations based 
on kinship and patronage alleviated and mitigated natural disasters and periodic fluc-
tuations. People lived in small, cooperative communities close to nature. Extensifica-
tion was possible and rates of population growth were limited. Technological im-
provements were not of the dramatic magnitude observed in later historical times. 
 In the Nile Valley, hunters and foragers exploited a wide range of large and small 
mammals, fish, birds, vegetables, legumes, and aquatic plants. The most important 
animals captured included wild cattle, hartebeest, and gazelle. The yield from all 
resources would have allowed a population density between 0.11-0.27 persons/sq. km 
or 0.34 to 0.82 persons/square mile (Hassan 1974: 154). In southern Egypt, with a 
total of 10,379 sq. km, the total population may not have exceeded 3,000 persons. The 
total population of all Egypt could not realistically have been greater than 10,000 per-
sons, consisting most likely of 10-15 "tribes" or regional population units. 
 The advent of agriculture was marked by the potential for increased food yield. 
High productivity was achieved by increasing the size of the labor force, especially re-
quired during the time of land preparation, sowing and harvesting. This provided an
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incentive both for an increase in family size, and the number of people engaging in col-
lective subsistence activities. 
 Storage and processing of food led to year-round residency close to the fields. Seden-
tariness and large co-residential populations represented the beginning of deleterious 
assault on the environment. Wild game and plants, wood for fuel, and other resources 
around the early farming villages were quickly reduced or depleted. This forced peo-
ple to depend more heavily on domesticated plants and animals. 
 Increased yields from farming also led to dependence on a few selected resources. In 
Egypt, barley and wheat became the major staple food. Domesticated animals con-
sisted mostly of cattle, sheep/goats, and pigs. Settlements were located close to the 
fields at the edge of the floodplain. The minor amounts of wild plants in the diet of ear-
ly Predynastic people (around 5000-3800 B.C.) clearly indicate that by that time wild 
plants were either depleted or replaced by domesticated food. 
 By 3800 B.C., permanent villages existed all over Egypt. The population jumped to 
a few hundreds of thousands. The total population perhaps did not exceed 450,000 
people, with a population density that did not exceed 20 persons/sq. km. It was likely 
in the range of 10-20 person/sq. km. 
 Agricultural systems are vulnerable due to the impact of agricultural practices on 
soil fertility and their susceptibility to inclement weather, flooding, droughts, and pest 
infestations. The vulnerability of agricultural systems promotes extensification - ex-
pansion into neighboring cultivable land. Occasional shortages also may be overcome 
by economic integration of neighboring farming groups. Economic exchanges bet-
ween hunters, herders, foresters, or miners and farmers may also establish regional or 
even interregional exchange networks. 
 During the Predynastic period (5000-3000 B.C.) political changes included a transi-
tion from village corporate societies into chiefdoms, and eventually to provincial 
states (Hassan 1988). There is abundant evidence from mortuary goods for the 
emergence of an elite who had access to status goods that included precious stones (in-
cluding gold, silver, and lapis lazuli), stone vases, rippled knives, ivory combs, 
bracelets and armlets, and copper objects. The tombs of the elite were spatially 
segregated from those of the commoners. They were bigger, better constructed, and 
more elaborate. By the end of the Predynastic, urban centers with their own 
cemeteries emerged in various parts of Egypt and are clearly manifest around Nagada 
and Hierakonpolis in Upper Egypt. 
 The rulers began to form regional alliances and federations. Territorial integration 
of neighboring regions in Egypt culminated in the initial attempts at unification of 
Egypt as a nation-state perhaps as early as 3300 B.C., and with effective unification of 
the country from 3000-2800 B.C. By that time Egypt was ruled by a divine king, a 
priesthood, and a bureaucracy. Provincial chiefs, loyal to the king, administered rural 
communities in numerous provinces. They ruled from towns connected to the villages 
by direct roads and canals, and had access to the capitals of southern and northern 
Egypt by Nile boats. 
 In later times, the unity of Egypt under central authority was shaken repeatedly and 
the country was fragmented into warring camps. A nation-state, as in Egypt, is com-
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posed of various political provinces, unified by ideological and economic bonds bet-
ween the chiefs of the provinces and the king. When central authority weakens for 
whatever reason (weak ruler, palace rivalry, economic disasters, invasions, etc.), 
powerful chiefs may attempt to claim the throne. As early as the Second Dynasty (c. 
2770 B.C.), the unity of the country was threatened by rival claimants to the throne. 
By 2130 B.C., Egypt was divided and ruled from two different capitals. The country 
was destablized probably as a result of economic failures caused by inadequate Nile 
flooding. Later (New Kingdom and Late period), the rise of generals in a military socie-
ty also led to frequent upheavals. These cycles of unification and fragmentation are 
typical of traditional agrarian state societies. The "diastrophic" events of disruption 
have their toll on the environment, and must be considered as a key feature in the 
socioecology of agrarian states. 
 Agrarian state societies also provided the incentive for technological improvements 
in order to increase revenue. However, it seems that it was not until the New Kingdom 
(1550 B.C.) that improved irrigation, due to the use of a simple water-lifting device 
(the shaduf), provided the basis for an expanded area under cultivation, to perhaps as 
much as 30% of the floodplain. By Graeco-Roman times, productivity and land area 
were increased as a result of marling, manure fertilization, adequate canal irrigation, 
the use of the water-wheel for irrigation (saqqia), drainage, reservoirs, and cultivation 
of two crops a year with sorghum as a summer crop.
AGRICULTURE, EMPIRES AND MILITARISM
 During the seventeenth century B.C. Egypt was attacked by warriors from the 
eastern frontiers. The invader, known as the Hyksos, took control of the Delta by 
1640 B.C. The invasion may have been, at least in part, precipitated by climatic 
droughts during the peak of a dry period and the country may have also been weaken-
ed as a result of a series of low Nile floods. Egypt responded by developing a military 
machine that repelled the invaders, but consequently Egypt was transformed into a 
military power with a standing army and investment in military technology and 
organization. For the next five centuries (1550-1070 B.C.) Egypt clashed with the 
military empires of the Near East and after a series of triumphs, a combination of low 
floods and political turmoil, the rising power of priests and military generals weaken-
ed the country. Turmoil prevailed from 1070 to 525 B.C. The rule of Egypt came 
under the high priests of Thebes, "Libyan" families from the Delta, Nubians, and 
rival kings. This eventually made Egypt vulnerable to the rising military powers in ad-
jacent regions. Persian, Greek and later Roman armies marched into the country and 
turned it into a colony. 
 Since the New Kingdom, militarism became a dominant theme in Egyptian state 
affairs. The demands of a military society in ancient Egypt, as in other military 
societies, placed a burden that had to be met by increasing production. This is in-
dicated by an increase in land area from the Old Kingdom to the Graeco-Roman 
period from about 1 million feddans to about 2.25 million feddans (2.17 million
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acres). Productivity also is estimated to have increased from about 450 kg/feddan to 
800 kg/feddan (Hassan in press). 
 The rise of the Egyptian empire during the New Kingdom, was paralleled in the 
Near East by other empires (e.g., the Assyrians). The emergence of the Persian empire 
and the following Greek/Macedonian empire heralded the beginning of Imperial 
dominions extending from Greece to India. In 525 B.C. Egypt fell to the Persians and 
in 332 B.C. Alexander invaded and established the Macedonian Dynasty, which was 
followed by the Ptolemaic Dynasty, lasting until 30 B.C., when Egypt became a 
Roman colony and the granary of Rome. 
 Under Philadelphus (246 A.D.) as much as 1.5 million artabas (33.8 million kg) 
were supplied to Rome. Under Justinian, the amount increased to 8 million artabas 
(18 million kg). The population of Egypt, providing the necessary labor for 
agricultural production, rose from an estimated 1.25 million people during the Old 
Kingdom to 3.25 million people during the Graeco-Roman period. 
 The Roman World consisted of 60 million (about one/fifth of the world population 
then). The empire became too large after 180 A.D. to remain stable, and in order to de-
fend it, Diocletian (284-305 A.D.) enlarged the army from 300,000 to 500,000. 
However, Rome suffered from increasing costs of defence and bureaucracy: increasing 
taxes and inflation brought the empire to the verge of collapse. 
 Militaristic regimes, often linked with imperial expansion, can lead to disruptions 
of farming activities, depopulation, and emigration as a result of battles. Military ac-
tivity also causes major disruptions and can lead to severe ecological problems related 
to neglect of soil conservation and irrigation works, or aggregation of refuges in 
marginal habitats, as well as the intensive exploitation of wild food resources.
AGRICULTURE, AN INDEX OF ECOLOGICAL IMPACT
 The increase in population size and the emergence of a ruling elite and func-
tionaries, albeit small (5-10% of the total population), meant an increase in the 
ecological impact on local resources. In Table 2, the temporal changes in the 
ecological impact from the late-Palaeolithic to Graeco-Roman times in Egypt are in-
dicated as a function of 1) the total population, 2) the proportion of elite and urban 
functionaries and, 3) their relative rates of consumption. The ecological index obtain-
ed presents a rough indicator of the relative impact on the Nile Valley, and is based on 
population estimates, and relative rank estimates of one unit of consumption per 
forager; 1.5 per farmers, deteriorating later to less than one; three units of consump-
tion for functionaries and well-to-do urban dwellers; and 30 units of consumption for 
nobility and royalty. The proportion of the latter ranges from 1-3% (Braudel 1979), 
whereas the proportion of the functionaries (the middle sector) may be estimated at 
between 8 and 12% of the total population depending on the historical circumstances. 
The simple ecological impact index shows the relative magnitude of ecological impact 
of consumption on the environment calculated as ratio of the total consumption units 
of the late-Palaeolithic. Thus, by Graeco-Roman times the ecological impact of the
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Late Palaeolithic 10,000 10,000 1 1
Early Predynastic 100,000 150,000 15 1.5
Late Predynastic 400,000 630,000 63 1.58
Old Kingdom 1,200,000 2,088,000 208 1.74
New Kingdom 2,000,000 3,736,000 374 1.86
Graeco-Roman/Arab 3,250,000 6,646,725 664 2.05
1300-1700 3,500,000 7,077,500 708 2.02
1859 5,125,000 10,378,125 1038 2.03
1966 3,000,000 69,000,000 6900 2.3
1982 4,400,000
2000 (69,000,000)
Egyptian population was about 600-700 times that of late-Palaeolithic hunters and 
foragers. It was also 44 times greater than that of early farmers and about three times 
that of the Old Kingdom.
COMMERCE AND PROTO-INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE
 Conditions similar to those that prevailed in Ancient Egypt by Graeco-Roman times 
continued more or less the same during the Arab period until about the thirteenth cen-
tury A.D. The population of Egypt fluctuated around a mean of about 2 million peo-
ple from 634 A.D. to 1180 A.D. The ecological impact was also mostly within the 
range of that of Graeco-Roman times. Similar conditions prevailed in other 
agricultural countries in the world. Low agricultural technology was characterized by 
a moderate impact on the environment. The situation was altered with the advent of 
agrarian technology including mechanized farming, fertilizers, monocropping over 
large areas, speciality crops, multiple cropping, large-scale land reclamation, and ir-
rigation. The advent of such techno-agriculture was, in essence, a second agrarian 
revolution that had two major consequences: (1) it allowed commerce and manufactur-
ing to flourish; and (2) it permitted populations to grow to meet the demands of 
techno-agriculture, commerce, and later industry. From an ecological standpoint 
more people meant a greater impact on human habitats. The increase in world popula-
tion was also accompanied by the rise of a greater percentage of high-level consumers 
with a relatively greater impact on the environment. 
 In Europe, agrarian changes commenced around the eleventh century A.D. when 
commerce within continental Europe and across the Mediterranean ushered in a new 
commercial segment of society, which eventually expanded at the expense of the
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church and nobility. The new commercial regime fostered secular and practical 
knowledge and later facilitated the emergence of a new industrial technology, and an 
agro-industrial economy. The new regime benefited from the inherited knowledge of 
previous civilizations. Ancient knowledge was introduced to Europe through the 
efforts of Arab scholars who culled, preserved and synthesized scholarly contributions 
in all fields of knowledge from Persia, Iraq, Greece, Egypt, India, and China. Arabs 
also laid the foundation of a system of knowledge based on observation and ex-
perimentation that served as the basis for western science and technology. 
 The dawn of European hegemony thus rested on the fruits of cosmopolitan learn-
ing, new trade opportunities, and a new socio-political order in which merchants and 
financiers were becoming a distinct and powerful elite. Trade and commerce, backed 
by military might, linked Europe with many parts of the world providing slaves and 
cheap natural resources. 
 The role of commerce in promoting agriculture and militarism can also be observed 
in the Japanese experience in the fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries when Kyoto 
became a political and a cultural center. The basis of the Japanese economy was 
agrarian, and as in Europe, improvements in farming technology, greater use of draft 
animals, new crops, and new strains of rice led to an increase in agricultural produc-
tivity. Also, as in Europe, this stimulated commerce and manufacturing, which in 
turn stimulated accumulation of capital and technological developments. Japan ex-
ported fine swords, copper, sulfur, folding fans, and screens of consummate crafts-
manship. Commercial developments fostered the growth of markets and market 
towns. The activities and privileges of the merchants were safeguarded by powerful 
families, religious institutions and the military. 
 In England, the period from 1540 to 1850 witnessed key changes in agrarian ac-
tivities and an increase in productivity. The changes included bringing more land 
under cultivation, local specialization, cultivation of fodder crops, new crop rota-
tions, field drainage, and the use of the scythe in place of the sickle. 
 Egypt's involvement in the world market economy from the thirteenth to the eigh-
teenth century seems also to have lead to agrarian changes that included bringing more 
land under cultivation. From Graeco-Roman times, the area under cultivation in fed-
dans averaged 2 million feddans, with a low of 1.53-1.6 million in 975-1090 A.D. 
From 1298 to 1798, the area cultivated averaged 4.25 million acres. The population of 
Egypt also rose from an average of 2 million persons to approximately 3.5 million bet-
ween the late-thirteenth and the sixteenth century. The collapse of Egypt's commercial 
role and the despotic rule of the Ottomans affected Egypt adversely, as indicated by 
the drop in population in 1799-1802 to 2.5 million. There is also evidence from pollen 
data in the Fayum lake that canals were not maintained, and that agricultural condi-
tions worsened. 
 The world from 1300 to 1800 witnessed an increase in population from 400 million 
to one billion persons. This doubling of world population conforms with the observed 
population increase in Egypt. This suggests that even if there was no increase in the in-
tensity of ecological damage, the impact of human activities on the planet would have 
at least doubled over five centuries.
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AGRO-INDUSTRY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
 Expansion of commerce in Europe depended upon increasing food production, 
specialized farming of "cash" crops, and manufacturing. By the seventeenth century, 
specialized farming (flax, tobacco, and hops) replaced subsistence farming in many 
places in Europe. By the 1780s, complex machinery and the invention of the steam 
engine ushered in the stage of mechanized agriculture and industry. The steam engine 
was first used commercially in 1785, but did not enter widespread use until after 1820. 
Use of coal and oil, and the growth of the chemical industry heralded a new phase in 
our impact on the earth. The addition of hydrocarbons, tar, smoke, sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide, heat, chlorofluorocarbons, and hazardous waste are 
the greatest threat to the resources that sustain humankind. They contribute to 
climatic perturbation, disease, ocean death, destruction of vegetation, and disap-
pearance of species. 
 The advent of modern industry, mass production, steam engines, and subsequently 
other advanced technological means of industrial production have drastically altered 
the structural relations between nature and humankind. Consumerism became ram-
pant. Political and religious order that restricted access to status and luxury goods 
gave way to mass consumption. Industrial production promoted and encouraged mass 
education for clerical and factory work. Industry and trade also led to an explosion in 
banking and administrative (bureaucratic) sectors. These developments were 
associated with greater opportunities for social mobility, which significantly increased 
the number of potential consumers. In addition, traditional nomadic herding or rais-
ing livestock shifted to livestock ranching and later to poultry and egg factories, beef-
feedlots, artificial food processing, and automated production. Food production also 
became linked with the world market economy. Food became a commodity aimed at 
generating profit rather than feeding people and combatting hunger. Food products in 
the agribusiness became divorced from the subsistence needs of the local com-
munities. Governments and business, with little or no interest in the affairs of farming 
communities, or the long-term productivity of the land, dictate the cultivation of cer-
tain crops with no regard for local demands or habitats. These transformations in 
food production must be regarded as among the most devastating developments in 
our relationship with nature. Accelerated deforestation, soil erosion, loss of soil fertili-
ty, addition of toxic substances to ecosystems, and the destruction of natural habitats 
are among the leading causes of the current global disaster. 
 The industrial transformation was also accompanied by a shift from rural com-
munities to urban industrial, administrative, and trade centers. Whereas at one time 
the temple dominated the landscape of a human settlement, the bank and factory 
chimneys mark the skyline of new industrial settlements. The dramatic increase in peo-
ple living in cities and the cancerous growth of city size since the eighteenth century is 
phenomenal. The impact on the environment has been catastrophic. The areas within 
the catchment of the city are heavily impacted as a result of food and other resources 
that must sustain the inhabitants of the city. In addition, the city is an ecological sore 
spewing toxic and hazardous substances threatening regional and global habitats.
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 The transition from a rural to an industrial urban setting was not only associated 
with a change in the natural landscape, but also accompanied by a change in the land-
scape of human society. Kinship organizations were swept away. Traditional values 
toward land, animals and plants were rapidly eroded. As a result, attitudes toward 
nature have shifted from conservation and harmony to exploitation and conquest. 
 In addition, the transition was accompanied by the development of an ideology of 
planning, engineering, and empirical and positivist science. The machine became the 
metaphor for human life. Beginning with the Renaissance and culminating as an 
ideology during the Enlightenment, the firm belief in laws, systems and rational plann-
ing set the tone for practical affairs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nature 
became decidedly the subject of human control and domination. 
 The rise of nation-states and international communication, as well as technological 
advances in warfare, have led to global disparities that divide our world, fostering 
resentment, violence, and destructive competition. The global disparity in standards 
of living and economic opportunities has resulted largely from the change in the 
balance of power between Europe and the rest of the world, leading to a phase of 
western imperialism. Although traditional imperialism has receded, the balance of 
economic, military, and political power is still tipped in favor of the West (and more 
recently Japan). Poorer countries strive to emulate the western model of industrializa-
tion. The imitation of the West leads to a demand for goods as a means of achieving 
(the appearance of) higher status. Unfortunately, the fictive improvement of status is 
often at the expense of adequate nutrition, health, and education. It also drains poor 
countries of savings for investment in basic projects for building infrastructure and 
economic development. 
 Hunger and poverty, the outcome of global disparities, are aggravated by high rates 
of population growth (among poor nations) that have no parallel in human history 
before the seventeenth century. Paradoxically, the poor need more children to in-
crease family income and for support in later years. Lacking social and financial securi-
ty the poor increase in numbers, and thus poor nations become poorer. The expecta-
tions of the poor are also increasing as a result of the promotion of consumer goods 
by global electronic media: hence any alleviation of living conditions is aggravated by 
a change in what constitutes poverty. Moreover, the material advancement of rich na-
tions continues to widen the gap between rich and poor. The new revolution in in-
dustrial production (based on advances in microelectronics, bioengineering, and 
materials science) may doom non-industrial nations to worse levels of poverty. 
 In Egypt, scientific and industrial agrarian innovations were first introduced by 
Mohamed Ali, who ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1849. His attempts at industrialization 
were sabotaged by various foreign powers (Britain, France, Austria, Russia and 
Prussia) but were later revived by Ismail (1863-79). However, industrial activities were 
modest, a result of the desires of colonial powers to maintain Egypt as an agrarian 
state. Ismail, who wished to transform Egypt into a modern European-like society, 
depended on loans from foreign investors and governments for his modernization 
plans. Eventually, a French-British commission took control of Egyptian finances. In 
1882, in response to rising nationalist feelings, the British colonized Egypt. It was not
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until 1954 that Egypt regained its full independence. 
 Under colonial rule, industry in Egypt was never fully developed because of a lack 
of industrial and financial institutions, and the export of capital. Commercial ac-
tivities since Ismail, however, contributed to urbanization. Linkage with world com-
merce through the cultivation of cotton, the emergence of small-scale agrarian in-
dustries, and the rise of government bureaucracy to manage the commercial activities 
of foreigners, led to an increase in urban population and the rise of government func-
tionaries and professionals. 
 The population increased responding to greater opportunities for work in the cities 
and the new land opened by perennial irrigation for each crop. After 1952, the revolu-
tionary regime made serious steps toward building industrial institutions, attracting 
more people to the cities, and encouraging further population increase. Major 
reclamation projects were also undertaken adding 863,000 feddan from 1960 to 1969. 
The annual average rate of population growth increased after 1952 to 2.38% in 1960, 
2.54% in 1966, and 2.71% in 1976, compared with 1.78% in 1947 and 1.09% in 1907. 
 By 1966, the population of Egypt climbed to 30 million, twelve times the population 
in 1821. The urban population increased from 19% in 1966 to 41% in 1992. The in-
crease in urban population was concentrated in greater Cairo and the port cities, Alex-
andria, Suez, and Port Said. In 1966, Cairo was inhabited by about 5 million people. 
Today there are about 15 million people in Cairo. The urban population exerts a 
heavy toll on the environment as a result of uncontrolled small factories, emission 
from motor cars, fumes from ovens, garbage, continuous building activities, etc. The 
increasing population of Egypt has also placed a heavy burden on the land. The use of 
fertilizers has risen from 4.5 kg/feddan of cropped area in 1917 to 70 kg/feddan in 
1945-1939. Salinization and other soil problems pose a serious threat. The increasing 
number of people is also encroaching on the low desert bordering the Nile Valley 
where the archaeological remains of Ancient Egypt are located. Egypt also faces a 
severe water problem and further irrigation projects may prove to be ecologically un-
sound. 
 In Egypt and elsewhere, masses of poor people are striving to improve their living 
conditions. They aspire to increase their income by working hard and minimizing pro-
duction costs in order to obtain consumer status goods. They are tantalized by the 
wealth of an urban elite and profiteers, and by western images of power and success 
transmitted to every home via TV. The interconnections between consumerism, ine-
qualities of power, economic disparities, population, and poverty combine to pro-
mote "dirty" industrial production, deterioration of living conditions, and destruction 
of natural resources. More people continually demanding more goods makes a tremen-
dous impact on our planet. The increase in world population has to be multiplied by a 
factor proportional to the increase in the rate of consumption per capita. In addition, 
the nature of items consumed exerts great pressure on certain critical resources (e.g., 
certain animals, minerals, and fossil fuels). They are also associated with the produc-
tion of pollutants that are contributing to the deterioration of local and regional 
resources. Moreover, they are sufficiently widespread and of such intensity that they 
have begun to interact with biospheric and atmospheric processes.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
 The grim situation humanity faces today is the result of evolutionary developments 
that began with the advent of agriculture. 
 Our impact on natural resources and the earth has increased at a rate much greater 
than that of the incredible population increase that attended the transitions from hun-
ting-gathering to the present. With the advent of state society, the emergence of a rul-
ing elite signaled the emergence of "super-consumers" who had a much higher stan-
dard of living compared with that of the rest of the population. 
 In traditional societies the proportion of this category of consumers was small 
(1-15°7o), and had remained low until the break-down of the archaic state (which 
lasted well into historical times, as in medieval Europe). The rise of global exploration 
and world trade promoted technological innovations which destabilized traditional 
political regimes based on king and church. Industry and consumerism associated 
with opportunities of social mobility were not only associated with a dramatic increase 
in population, but also with the emergence of large number of "middle" consumers. 
Consumption, in this context, was geared towards the acquisition of material goods 
that display and signal status in the social hierarchy. Food, shelter, and clothing, for 
example, ceased to be merely for meeting biological needs, and became primarily sym-
bols of prestige and power. 
 Industrial and commercial powers subjected the majority of humanity to secure raw 
materials and man-power, creating a global rift between affluent and poor nations. 
However, the whole world became linked in a social hierarchy with the behavioral pat-
terns of the powerful industrial/commercial nations as the model to emulate. Accor-
dingly, the number of middle-consumers significantly increased. Moreover, the level 
of expectation continues to rise as the gap between the affluence of the powerful and 
the poverty of the mass of humanity widens. 
 Industrial and commercial agriculture was expanded and intensified to meet the 
demands of the rising numbers of consumers. But, industrial and commercial produc-
tion proved to be far more destructive to human habitats because of its massive im-
pact on the land, and the use of harmful and hazardous substances (e.g., fetilizers, 
pesticides, fuels) and practices (mechanized tilling, dams, and "reclamation", 
deforestation, specialized crops, etc.). 
 Industry and commerce also fostered the emergence of cities that serve as ecological 
"hot-spots" inflicting great damage to the planet. Installations in industrial nations 
have also contributed over the last 200 years to pollution and environmental damage. 
At present, poor nations, in order to compete with affluent industrial nations cannot 
afford to pay for "clean" industry. 
 The ecological crisis cannot be solved by technological fixes or simple restorative 
remedies. To halt further deterioration and destruction of our planet and our local 
habitats, we must re-examine our values and cultural practices. We also need to re-ex-
amine our predicament not from that of separate, competing nation-states but from 
the vantage of a long historical trajectory and a global perspective. 
 Our onslaught on the environment is embedded in an ethos of conquest and con-
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flict. As long as our ethos and world-view is based on a confrontation with others and 
nature, efforts to remedy our present predicament are rather slim. The practical solu-
tions are political, technological, and social, but such practical solutions are not possi-
ble without a change of heart. In an essay on the "Future of Science", Bertrand 
Russell concluded that the progress of science was not a boon to mankind since 
science had enabled the holders of power to realize their "evil" purposes. Reviewing 
the ill-effects of science, Russell remarked that "Science is no substitute for virtue; the 
heart is as necessary for good life as the head." Only kindliness, he concluded, can 
save the world. 
 We are often tempted to search for technological or managerial solutions to our con-
temporary problems. I hope that it is clear, from my survey of the ecological conse-
quences of cultural transformations, that technology and management are not 
separable from ethos and ethics. We are motivated to acquire material goods for 
reasons that are embedded in a hierarchical ethos and a sense of self-esteem based on 
the acquisition and display of material goods. The industrial ethos is combative and 
aggressive, nation against nation, class against class, individual against society, man 
against nature, and man against man. Although this ethos has its roots in ancient state 
societies, it has never been as destructive to humanity and nature as it is today because 
of the cancerous growth of the human population and the spiraling number of "super-
consumers". The ecological crisis is only one symptom of a deeper malaise. We cannot 
continue to look the other way as millions die from starvation and war and pretend 
that we will not be affected. The suffering of others dehumanizes us. We cannot also 
continue to ignore the evil consequences of our desire for status (consumer) goods or 
the degradation of our natural habitat. Pollution knows no national boundaries. Each 
country is under siege. The ethos of short-term gains fostered by industrial and post-in-
dustrial practices is potentially disastrous for our own children and catastrophic for 
our grandchildren. The change in ethos is the responsibility of those who are aware of 
the magnitude of the danger. People must demand and guarantee their ecological 
rights, and they ought as individuals and organizations to persuade and pressure politi-
cians, the media, and industry to promote a sound ecological ethos, ecologically 
benign technology, and an alternate ideal of self-esteem based on the social virtues of 
modest living, compassion, and sharing. We are not prisoners of the past. We have 
passed through many transformations in a long journey of failures and successes. We 
have reached summits of intellectual and artistic achievements, but we now face the 
peril of degradation and dehumanization. Five thousand years of history has molded 
us into a single global civilization. Our failure will be unprecedented in its magnitude 
and ramifications. Luckily, in an age of information we are also capable of looking at 
the past to shape the future. Collectively we have the resources to turn our world 
around and avoid the path of destruction. The ruins of ancient civilization remind us 
of the fragility of power. What endures of a civilization is not so much the glory of 
things, but the invisible moments that bind us together and the wonder of playing at 
the eternal shores of nature.
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